## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY

			(3.4	25X1
COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT		
SUBJECT	Political Developments in the USSR after Stalin's Death	DATE DISTR.	25 June 1954	
	STOCK BOALTH & DEATH	NO. OF PAGES	2	
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD	
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES		25X1
	This is UNEVALUATED Information	ח		
	THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TE (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)			25X1

- 1. The crisis which had been precipitated in the Soviet Union by the death of Stalin and the premature culmination of the conflict between Beriya and Malenkov is still very much in the fore. Although Malenkov succeeded in breaking the neck of Beriya, the crisis remains much more acute than is generally known. Notwithstanding perpetual purges, a large number of partisans of Beriya continue to hold responsible positions and, for the time being, Malenkov dares not liquidate them.
- 2. Malenkov's position depends to some extent on Khrushchev, who controls the Party and who may be regarded as the future strong man of the Soviet Union.
- 3. The Army still maintains a wait-and-see attitude. As in the Government, there are two distinct trends in the Army; one desires collaboration with the Germans, the other is afraid of them.
- The removal of Beriya and the apparent inability speedily to liquidate his partisans have produced much internal weakness in the Soviet Union and this will continue for some time. As a result of the destruction of Beriya's police clique, the most efficient weapon of oppression of the regime has been shaken to the core and is, at least temporarily, no longer in a position to enforce the former iron discipline and internal order.
  - 5. Malenkov's pan-Russian tendencies are provoking resistance among the Asiatic nations of the Soviet Union. Beriya was an Asiatic a Georgian.
  - 6. Compared with Stalin, Malenkov is a mere nobody. This in turn has made MAO-Tse-tung much more important in comparison. As the founder of Communist China, he might even assume the role of leader of World Communism.
  - 7. Whatever turn events may take in the near future, for the time being Malenkov is weak. He needs nothing so much as time to regain his breath and, if possible, some success in foreign policy to boost his position. He is afraid of war. Should he, however, succeed in gaining control of the situation, he will start to pull the regime together in the coming year, to fortify his position among the satellites, and to launch a more aggressive foreign policy.

					SEC	RET	/CONTRO	L - '	US OFFI	CTAL	Y.TWO B					
STATEET	x	ARMY	х	NAVY	,	х	AIR	х	FBI		AEC	Γ	,			
							·						L	<u>'                                    </u>	 	L

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

25X1

-2-

- 8. It is therefore, a great mistake to strengthen Malenkov's prestige by various offers of non-aggression pacts or other agreements. What is still more serious is the sense of insecurity and confusion such offers create among the oppressed nations, as well as mistrust towards the West. That, in turn, paralyzes resistance in the satellite countries.
- 9. It is clear that, if Malenkov should succeed in consolidating his position enough to launch an aggressive foreign policy by next year, it would kill all centrifugal tendencies among satellite governments (especially in Czechoslovakia) and greatly reduce resistance among the oppressed nations.

SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY